We study the evolution of health investment over the life-cycle within the context of an overlapping generations general equilibrium model. We calibrate the model to match key economic aggregates and quantify the importance of health as both a consumption and investment good. Good health has a high investment value early in the life-course, but this steadily declines with age until retirement when it is zero. In contrast, the consumption value of health exhibits a hump shape due to a continuously increasing marginal utility of
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Grossman (1972a) develops the canonical model of health investment. In it, two motives guide a person's health investment. The …rst is that individuals derive utility from being healthy. The second is that good health enables individuals to supply more labor either to the labor market or at home. The former reason is referred to as the "consumption motive"and the latter as the "investment motive." The relative importance of each of these motives will change over an individual's life and, in particular, as people age, health will gradually move from an investment good to a consumption good. Indeed, for the young and healthy, the marginal utility of good health is low and the number of years that they still have to live is high and so, for them, the consumption motive is low and the investment motive is high. In contrast, for the old and frail, the opposite is true and so, their health investment is primarily driven by the consumption motive. While this discussion is a direct qualitative implication of the Grossman Model, little if anything is understood about how the motives for and returns to health investment evolve over the life-course in the quantitative sense. Indeed, to date, no study (at least that we are aware of) has attempted to carry out such an exercise using data on labor supply, health and medical expenditures from the United States. This is our paper's primary task.
To accomplish this, we build on Grossman's original work and extend it to an overlapping generations general equilibrium framework (GE) while embedding the current rules of the US Social Security system. We calibrate the model by matching key economic aggregates and assess its performance by comparing the life-cycle pro…les of key outcomes from the model to those calculated from the data. Using these calibrated parameters and the Euler Equation for health investment, we calculate the returns to health investment and then quantify the relative importance of each of the motives discussed above. In addition, because we have a structural model, we are able to shed light on the role that time investment (as opposed to goods investment) in health plays as people age. This is important because time investment in health is inherently di¢ cult to measure (or even conceptualize) and so our paper provides a deductive means of assessing this critical but little understood input to health.
In addition, because we endogenize the health stock and labor supply, our framework is able to shed light on potential consequences of social security reform that have yet to receive much attention in the literature. These insights are made possible because we extended Grossman's model to a GE framework. We run counter-factual policy simulations in which we calculate the impact of some commonly proposed social security reforms such as reduced bene…ts and a later retirement age on the labor supply, health investment and morbidity of the working-aged population.
Our paper primarily contributes to and bridges the gap between two literatures within economics. The …rst is the literature on the theory and, subsequently, the econometric estimation of models of health investment. The theoretical literature began with Grossman (1972a) but, since then, has grown substantially with many authors such as Muurinen (1982) and Picone, Uribe and Wilson (1998) generalizing Grossman's original work. For a comprehensive discussion of these developments, we refer the reader to Grossman (1999) . Accompanying these theoretical developments has been empirical work that has attempted to structurally estimate the parameters of the Grossman's original model. While the later attempts by Wagsta¤ (1993) have proved more successful than the earlier attempts by Wagsta¤ (1986) and Grossman (1972b) , no attempt has proven entirely satisfactory. We believe that the reason for this is that, as pointed out by Wagsta¤ (1993) This has spawned the most recent generation of papers that incorporate health into computational life-cycle models of behavior. In this generation, health is modeled as a durable consumption good a la Grossman (1972a) . For example, Hall and Jones (2007) use a Grossman-type model to explain the recent increases in medical expenditures in the US. Yogo (2008) also uses a model of health investment to investigate the portfolio choice of retirees and argues that the large savings rate observed among the elderly is the consequence of a large bequest motive and not a precautionary motive as others (e.g. Palumbo 1999) have argued. Neither paper would have been able to make their conclusions without an endogenous health stock. Our paper …ts into this strand of the literature. However, there are notable di¤erences. We investigate the life-cycle motives for health investment and its interaction with labor supply. While Hall and Jones (2007) investigate the evolution of medical expenses over time, they do not do so over the life-course nor do they consider labor supply. Yogo (2008) is also similar to our work, but he also does not consider labor supply and retirement. Finally, because we remain true to Grossman's original framework, we are also able to further much of the literature on the estimation of models of health investment that was started by Michael Grossman and Adam Wagsta¤.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Model

Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of …nite-lived individuals with measure one. Each individual lives at most J periods. For each age j J; the conditional probability of surviving from age j 1 to j is denoted by ' j 2 (0; 1).
Notice that we have ' 0 = 1 and ' J+1 = 0. The survival probability f' j g J j=1 is treated as exogenously given. We assume that annuity market is absent in this economy and accidental bequests are collected by the government and uniformly distributed back to all agents currently alive.
Each period the number of newborns grows at a constant rate n. The share of age-j individuals in the population j is given by j = j 1 ' j 1 + n with P J j=1 j = 1. We will use the age share as weights to calculate aggregate quantities in the economy.
Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption, leisure and health. Each individual maximizes the expected, discounted lifetime utility
where denotes the subjective discount factor, c consumption, l leisure, and h health status. The period utility function takes the form 
Budget Constraints
Each period individuals are endowed with one unit of time. They split the time among working (n), enjoying leisure (l), being sick(s), and investing in health accumulation (v). Therefore, we have following time allocation equation
Following Grossman (1972a), we assume sick time s j is a decreasing function of the health status
where Q is the scale factor and measures the sensitivity of sick time to health.
Each individual works until an exogenously given mandatory retirement age j R .
Individuals di¤er in their labor productivity due to their di¤erences in age. We use " j denote the e¢ ciency unit of an age-j agent. Let w be the wage rate and r be the rate of return on asset holdings. w" j n j is the age-j individual's labor income. The individual faces the following budget constraint
where m j is health investment in goods, a j is asset holding, ss is the social security tax rate, and T is the accidental bequests distributed back to the individuals.
Once an individual is retired, she receives the social security bene…ts b. Following Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), we model the social security system in a simple way. The social security bene…ts are calculated to be a fraction of some base income which we take as the average lifetime labor income
is referred to the replacement ratio. The only role that government plays in this economy is to administer the social security system. The vector ( ; ss ) represents the policy instruments of the government. An age-j retiree faces the following budget constraint
We assume that agents are not allowed to borrow so that
Finally, there is no annuity market.
Health Investment
Following Grossman (1972a), we assume that individuals have to use both goods and time to produce health. The accumulation of health stock across ages is given by
where h j is the age-dependant depreciation rate of health stock, measures the relative importance of goods expenditure in health investment, represents the return to scale for health investment and B measures the productivity of medical care
technology. Note that most of recent wave of general equilibrium models including health (Suen 2006 , Feng 2008 ) only put the goods input in the health accumulation process whereas we exactly follow Grossman (1972)'s original idea to include both goods and time input into the health accumulation equation. Therefore our model is able to capture the "investment motive"for the health investment.
Technology
This economy has a constant returns to scale production function
in which K and N are aggregate capital and labor inputs, respectively. The …nal good can be either consumed or invested into physical capital or health stock. The aggregate resource constraint is given by
C t is aggregate consumption, M t is aggregate goods expenditure in health, and I t is aggregate investment in physical capital. Law of motion of aggregate capital thus
where is the depreciation rate on physical capital.
The representative …rm maximizes its pro…ts and ends up with following optimization conditions that determine wage rate and net real return to capital
Individual' s Problem
In this economy, an age-j individual solves a dynamic programming problem. The state space at the beginning of age j is described by a vector (a j 1 ; h j ), where a j 1 is the asset holding at the beginning of age j, and h j is health status at age j. Let V j (a j 1 ; h j ) denote the value function of an age-j individual given the state vector (a j 1 ; h j ). The Bellman Equation is then given by
subject to
Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Given the model environment, the de…nition of a stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy is standard. Let A = fa 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a m g denote the admissible set of asset holdings, H =fh 1 ; h 2 ; :::; h n g denote the admissible set of health status, M = fm 1 ; m 2 ; ::; m p g denote the admissible set of medical expenditure, and N = fn 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n k g denote the set of the discrete grids for possible working hours or time investment in health. Therefore, we have state vector (a; h) 2 A H. for each age j = 1; 2; :::; J; a price vector fw; rg; and a lump-sum transfer T such that (i) Given prices, policy combination and a lump-sum transfer T , decision rules C j ; M j ; A j ; N j ; T V j and value function V j solve the individuals'problem (13).
(ii) Price vector fw; rg is determined by the …rm's …rst-order maximization conditions (11) and (12) .
(iii) The law of motion for the distribution of agents over the state space follows
(iv) Social security system is self-…nancing (pay-as-you-go):
(vi) Individual and aggregate behavior are consistent:
(vii) Goods market clears:
(viii) Time constraint is satis…ed as in (3).
The Data
We employ data from two sources. Because we estimated the individual …xed e¤ects, our estimates are not tainted by heterogeneity across individuals (and, by implication, cohorts). Each …gure plots the estimated coe¢ cients on the dummy variables. Figure 1 shows the income pro…le (in 2004 dollars). The …gure shows a hump shape with a peak at about 60K in the early …fties. A major source of this decline is early retirements. This can be seen in Figure 2 which plots yearly hours worked. Hours worked are pretty steady at just over 40 per week until about the mid-…fties when they start to decline quite rapidly. Figure 3 shows the pro…le of health status. The …gure shows a steady decline in
health. Approximately 95% of the population reported being healthy at age 25 and this declined to just under 60% at age 75.
Medical Expenditure Survey
Our MEPS sample spans the years 2003-2006. As discussed in Kashihara and Carper (2008) , the MEPS measure of medical expenditures which we employ includes "direct payments from all sources to hospitals, physicians, other health care providers (including dental care) and pharmacies for services reported by respondents in the MEPS-HC." Note that these expenditure include both out-of-pocket expenditures and expenditures from the insurance company. an increasing and convex relationship with age. Perhaps not surprisingly, we see that the medians are substantially below the means. This is almost certainly the consequence of the notoriously fat tail in medical expenditure data. Because we have a representative agent model, we will be matching the mean pro…le. However, the divergence between the medians and the means underscores the need to incorporate hetergeneity into the existing framework in future research.
Calibration
We now outline the calibration of the model's parameters. Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), we choose particular values for the parameters of the model partly in order to be consistent with microeconomic evidence and relevent literature, and partly to match selected long-run averages of US data.
Demographics
The model period is one year. Individuals are assumed to be born at the real-time age 21 and they can live up to a maximum age of J = 65 years. Death is certain 
Preferences
We set the subjective time discount factor = 0:97. We choose a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion = 2, which is a value widely used in the literature (e.g., Imro- 
Health Investment
We assume age-dependent depreciation rate of health stock h j takes the form
This functional form guarantees h j 2 (0; 1). And it also increases as individuals age. We think that it captures a natural deterioration trend of the health stock.
Other important parameters in health accumulation process: productivity of health accumulation technology B, share of goods expenditure in health investment , and the return to scale for health investment will be calibrated to match selected longrun averages of US data.
Technology
Following Prescott (1986), we set the capital share in production function = 0:36.
The depreciation rate of physical capital = 0:069 is taken from Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1999). We allow labor-augumenting technological change in the model economy and set it equal US long-run growth rate of per capita output 1:6%.
Social Security
The social security replacement ratio is set to be 40%. Since the social security system is self-…nanced, this replacement ratio thus determines the social security payroll tax in the model economy. 
The Remaining Parameters
There are nine parameters remain to be determined. They are share of consumptionleisure composition in utility function , productivity of health accumulation technology B, share of goods expenditure in health investment , the return to scale for health investment , scale factor of sick time A, elasticity of sick time to health , and three parameters that determine age-dependent depreciation rate of health stock a 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 . Our strategy is to choose these parameter values so that the model economy replicates certain long-run empirical characteristics of the U.S. economy.
These long-run statistics are summarized in Table 1 .
We summarize our baseline parameterization in Table 2 . 
Parameter Description
Value n population growth rate 2% J maximum life span 65 j R mandatory retirement age 45 f' j g J j=1 conditional survival probabilities Faber (1982) f" j g j R 1 j=1 age-e¢ ciency pro…le see text subjective time discount factor 0:97 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 2 elasticity of
Results
Using the calibrated parameters values summarized in Table 2 , we compute the model using the standard numerical method. We report model-generated life cycle pro…les in Figure 5 to Figure 10 . Figure 5 shows the life cycle pro…le of health expenditure. It shows an interesting pattern. It is close to zero until age 50, and it starts to increase. From age 60 to age 73, it increases dramatically from 0.0078 to 0.1563, 20 times higher. But after age 73, model predicts a sharp decline in medical spending. We explain the reason for this in the next section.
Since it is hard to compare the model-generated medical expenditures with the data, we turn to an important ratio to examine the model's performance. Figure 6 shows the life-cycle pattern of health expenditure-labor income ratio. In the data, this ratio is very low and stable until age 50, then it increases dramatically after age 62. The model captures this pattern. From age 62 to age 70, this ratio increases from 0.145 to 2.702 in the data, while the model predicts that the health expenditure-labor income ratio increases from 0.167 to 2.176. Health investment also crowds out consumption. In Figure 10 , we see the life cycle pro…le of consumption (excluding medical expenditure) also exhibits a hump shape. Indeed, consumption declines after age 60 which is when medical expenditure starts to increase dramatically. Accordingly, goods investment in health "crowds out"consumption.
Motives for Health Investment
The Euler Equation for health investment is given by
where M P M j = Bm ; shows that improvement in health due to this investment will directly increase the individual's utility. This term captures the "consumption" motive for the health investment.
Better health tomorrow will also raise the individual's labor income via a reduction in sick time. This is refered to as the "investment" motive for the health investment and is captured by the second term on the right-hand side of Equation (15),
. Note that since " j = 0 for age j j R , therefore "investment"motive disappears after the retirement. Better health tomorrow also provides a better starting point for future health accumulation. It is shown in the third term
. We call it the "continuation value"for health investment. Figure 11 shows the decomposition of these three terms over the life cycle. For young people, who are very healthy, the marginal utility of health is extremely small.
On the other hand, they are very active in the labor market, therefore, bene…ts from working longer hours vis reducing sick time are important. Accordingly, the investment motive dominates the consumption motive. When people get older, their health deteriorates and marginal utility of health, thus, increases. Meanwhile, they face a shorter working life when they near retirement. Their health investment thus is primarily driven by the consumption motive. The third panel shows the continuation value of health investment. Not surprisingly, it decreases over the life cycle due to the high depreciation rate of the health stock later in life.
Through repeated substitution, we obtain This equation states that the marginal bene…t of one additional unit of goods investment in health at age j is the sum of discounted accumulative "consumption" and factor for period t ahead of age j consists of three components: subjective time discount factor t , unconditional survival probability up to age j + t, and accumulation depreciation rate from age j to age j + t.
We show the cumulative "consumption"and "investment"motives in Figure 12 .
In this Figure, we see that the cummulative "investment"motives decrease over the life cycle and become zero after retirement. What is more interesting, however, is that the cumulative "consumption" motives exhibit a hump shape. They increase until age 60, and then decrease. There are two reasons for this. First, the marginal utility of health steadily increases with age due to health depreciation. Second, the e¤ective discount factor, which depends on the subjective discount rate, survival probability and the rate of health depreciation, steadily decreases over the life-course.
Early in life the increase in the marginal utility of health dominate the decrease in the subjective discount factor. However, this reverses at around age 60 when the decreasing discount factor is dominant.
Policy Experiment: Social Security
To be added. 
Conclusions
To be added.
We include individual …xed e¤ects to address heterogeneity across people and cohorts.
We then calculate the predicted wages and take averages for all ages 20 to 64. This is slightly di¤erent than Hansen (1993) 
due to Jensen's Inequality. Figure 1A shows the wage pro…le using four methods:
…xed e¤ects and OLS estimates of a regression of wages on a set of age dummies and …xed e¤ects and OLS estimation of regressions of income and hours on a set of age dummies. We refer to the last two methods as Hansen's methods. As it turns out, the four methods show similar results except for the later ages where our method yields higher wages. Most of this appears to be a consequence of omitted cohort e¤ects although aggregation bias also seems to matter somewhat. Finally, to calculate the e¢ ciency unit pro…le, we take the average predicted wages by age and divide by the average wage. Figure 2A shows this pro…le. (15) We derive the FOCs for the individual's problem (13) as follows:
c j :
m j : j = j M P M j (17)
where j and j are the associated Langrangian multipliers for the budget constraint equation (5) and the skill accumulation equation (7) respectively. We also have Substituting (16) and (17) into (18), we obtain equation (15) .
